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Rights and Remedies at Risk:  




This article provides a taxonomy of the impact of the Brexit on human rights, categorised by the degree of risk 
posed by the process of separation and legal reform during and following withdrawal from the European Union. 
First providing an overview of the envisioned Brexit legal process, it outlines what will be lost, critically at 
risk, vulnerable to repeal, and at low risk of removal. It considers the loss of effective remedies; the (avoidable) 
uncertainty of EU and UK citizens’ rights; the exclusion of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights from 
incorporation as retained EU law; the implications of extensive delegated powers to amend retained EU law; 
and the systematic removal of executive and state accountability mechanisms under the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018. It assesses the potential impact of removing the foundation of equality, worker and 
consumer rights, and the acute vulnerability of ‘new’ rights. It argues that even where protections are not lost, 
they are critically at risk or significantly and substantially weakened. It questions whether common law and 
domestic remedies could fill the gap left in rights protection, exploring the complexities and contradictions 
arising from the new constitutional (un)settlement of powers. By categorising the impact of the Brexit process 
on rights by risk, this Article establishes the acute vulnerability of the UK’s framework of rights protection 
during and after the Brexit Process.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A. UK Withdrawal from the European Union: Certainties and Uncertainties 
Having triggered the Article 50 notification process in March 2017, nine months following the surprising result 
of the EU Referendum, the UK is to withdraw from the European Union on 29 March 2019 if there is no 
agreement with the EU, or following an extension or a transition period with an agreement.1 While there is 
continued uncertainty as to the likelihood of any agreement with the EU concerning withdrawal or any future 
arrangements, it is clear that the process by which UK will separate from the EU legal system will radically 
change the constitutional foundations of the UK. A new (un)settlement of the separation of powers between 
the executive, courts and parliament has emerged since the Referendum, encapsulated in the arguments of 
sovereignty, rights and the rule of law in and outside the Supreme Court in Miller.2 The Supreme Court 
recognised that the ECA is ‘not itself the originating source of’ EU law but rather a ‘conduit pipe’ by which 
EU law is introduced into domestic law,3 such that it ‘constitutes EU law as an entirely new, independent and 
overriding source of domestic law’.4 The judgment reached by both the High Court and Supreme Court in 
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1 Under the draft Withdrawal Agreement, the transition period will end on 31 December 2020, but this may be changed 
in the event of an extension to the Article 50 process.  
2 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 WLR 
583. 
3 [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 WLR 583, [65]. 
4 Miller [80]. 
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Miller5 was predicated in part on the potential loss of rights for the individual, and the judgments emphasised 
that only Parliament, and not the exercise of a royal prerogative by the executive, could legislate in a manner 
which impacted on individual rights. 
The UK government responded to concerns by promising that the Brexit process will not have a negative 
impact on rights.6 Arguing that existing protections in the common law, the Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA], 
and elsewhere in the legal system provide sufficient if not equivalent safeguards, the government downplayed 
the relevance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, general principles of EU law, and directly effective 
EU Treaty Rights in the framework of rights protection in the UK. However, this position is categorically 
untrue. The Brexit process will inevitably and negatively impact rights protection in the UK. Where certain 
rights are not wholly lost in Withdrawal, the removal of external oversight and obligations to rights 
instruments, as well as the excision of quasi-constitutional entrenchment of rights which resulted from EU 
Membership, not to mention the rejection of robust remedies for the violation of rights, will cumulatively and 
systematically weaken accountability, redress and remedy mechanisms against the (ab)use of executive and 
legislative power. 
As with any consideration of the Brexit process, a first and important methodological health warning: there is 
still a highly degree of uncertainty as to how, when and in what way the UK will withdraw from the EU.7 
Much will depend on an agreement, if there is an agreement, with the EU.8 Conditions for a future relationship 
with the EU could be predicated on adherence to rights principles. For example, the European Parliament has 
indicated that continued security cooperation between the UK and the EU would be conditional on remaining 
part of the ECHR.9 Any future agreement could even be the first of many (an experience of neighbouring 
countries of the EU)10 as the EU, the UK, and their legal relationship is subject to constant and ongoing 
consultation and (re)negotiation. As of February 2019, and only weeks before the deadline, optimism for a 
‘Deal’ with the EU seems misplaced, and there is little or no certainty regarding the future.  
Without a legally binding EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, this article is based on what scope there is for 
certainty. It draws primarily from the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 [EUWA], outlined in the next 
section. While the EUWA is predicated on the assumption that there will be a Withdrawal Agreement with the 
EU, its framework of the process by which the UK legal system, and so rights protections, is the most likely 
design and direction of the Brexit process ahead.11  
 
B. Overview of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
                                                                
5 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). The Divisional Court 
identified three categories of rights (1) those capable of replication in UK law; (2) those derived as citizens in other 
member states; and (3) the rights of participation in EU institutions that cannot be replicated, [56]-[57]. 
6 See eg Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Right by Right Analysis’ 
(5 December 2017). In context of Northern Ireland see Joint report from the negotiators of the EU and the UK government 
on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Art. 50 of the TEU on the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU, para 
53. 
7 This article is based on the state of the law as of February 2019. 
8 At the point of writing, it is uncertain as to whether there will be sufficient support for the ratification of the Withdrawal 
Agreement in Parliament. 
9 Rob Merrick, ‘Theresa May bows to EU by keeping UK in human rights convention after Brexit, enraging Tory right’ 
The Independent 12 July 2018. 
10 See eg Liisa Leppävirta and Päivi Leino ‘Does staying together mean playing together? The influence of EU law on 
co-operation between EU and non-EU states: the Nordic example’ (2018) EL Rev 295; and Zheng Sophia Tang ‘UK-EU 
civil judicial cooperation after Brexit: five models’ (2018) EL Rev 648. 
11 The Immigration and Social Security (EU Withdrawal) Bill as introduced has followed the EUWA model: repealing 
retained EU law relating to free movement (Clause 1), and delegating sweeping powers to reform the immigration system 
with even fewer limitations than the EUWA (Clause 4, Clause 5).  
3 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is designed to deliver the legal separation of the UK from the 
EU, and to shape the process of incorporation and legal reform which will follow it. Broadly, the EUWA will 
first repeal the European Communities Act 1972 [ECA] on ‘exit day’.12 To prevent a situation whereby a very 
significant amount of EU-derived law would cease to have legal authority by repeal of the ECA, the EUWA 
will then save EU-derived domestic legislation through incorporation into the domestic legal system.13 Direct 
EU legislation, such as EU regulations or decisions, which have effect before and on exit day, are also 
incorporated into the domestic law.14 The task of incorporation is complicated by the diversity of EU law 
norms within the UK legal system: some primary acts are directly based on EU obligations (eg Equality Act 
2010), while binding obligations are also sourced in directly effective EU law (eg non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality).  
The EUWA removes the principle of supremacy from any law passed after exit day but continues to apply it 
where relevant to the ‘interpretation, disapplication or quashing’ of any law made before exit.15 When 
interpreting retained EU-derived law, the courts are not bound to decisions of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union [CJEU] made after exit, nor can they refer any questions to the CJEU.16 Domestic courts may, 
however, ‘have regard’ to the decisions of the CJEU or any other EU body in ‘so far as it is relevant’.  While 
the Supreme Court is not bound to retained EU case law, lower courts must treat EU case law as having 
equivalent status as those of Supreme Court decisions and must interpret it ‘in accordance with retained case 
law and any retained general principles of EU law’.17 General principles of EU law18 are retained in domestic 
law (only if recognised by CJEU pre-exit case law) but given no right of action, nor is any court or tribunal 
permitted to disapply any rule of law or quash any conduct where they conflict with incorporated general 
principles of the EU.19 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is excluded from incorporation into domestic law,20 though it ‘does not 
affect the retention in domestic law … of any fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the 
Charter (and references to the Charter in any case law are, so far as necessary for this purpose, to be read as if 
they were references to any corresponding retained fundamental rights or principles).’ It was announced by 
the Department for Exiting the European Union [DExEU] that the ‘intention of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill is 
that those rights will continue to be protected.’21 The veracity of this statement will be questioned in this article 
The most controversial aspect of the EUWA arises under Section 8 EUWA entitled ‘dealing with deficiencies 
arising from withdrawal’. Ministers may by secondary legislation may any change to retained law ‘as the 
Minister considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate (a) any failure of retained EU law to operate 
effectively, or (b) any other deficiency in retained EU law’ arising from withdrawal.22 These changes, which 
are a matter of the subjective discretion of the Minister,23 can be made to any law of any status – including 
primary legislation. The limitations on the use of this unprecedented scale and scope of delegated power are 
limited: Ministers may not impose or increase taxes, create a criminal offence, or law with retrospective 
                                                                
12 Section 1 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. This is defined in the Act as 11:00pm on 29 March 2019. 
13 Section 2 EUWA. 
14 Section 3 EUWA. 
15 Section 5(1)-(2) EUWA. 
16 The Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure enables national courts to refer questions of the interpretation 
of the Treaties, or the validity and interpretation of any other EU law to the CJEU. 
17 Section 6(3) EUWA. 
18 General principles, including fundamental rights, legal certainty and proportionality, are key legal principles which 
were developed by the Court of Justice of the EU, and form part of the way in which the EU is governed. See Takis 
Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (OUP 2007).  
19 Schedule 1(2) EUWA. 
20 Section 5(4) EUWA. 
21 Right by Right Analysis, para 25, 13. 
22 Section 9(1) EUWA. 
23 See J Grogan, ‘The Lords have just raised the bar on the defence of rights and the rule of law in the Brexit process’ 
LSE Brexit Blog 27 April 2018: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/04/27/the-lords-have-just-raised-the-bar-on-the-
defence-of-rights-and-the-rule-of-law-in-the-brexit-process/. 
4 
application. They also may not amend, repeal or revoke the HRA or any legislation under it or amend the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. A sunset clause of two years is included in this section – though, controversially 
this may be amended by the Minister, and addition discussion of extension of this clause in the event of no-
deal is under discussion.24  
The inherent danger of this Henry VIII25 power to alter primary legislation through secondary acts, is the 
possibility that rights which the government have shown not to support could be in danger, as executive policy-
making could be disguised as necessary reform of the law, passed with limited parliamentary checks. Limited 
oversight is envisioned under the bill, and even less is possible given the sheer scale and scope of changes to 
be made.26 Delegating unprecedented scope of legislative power to the executive, the Act has been widely 
subject to criticism,27 particularly concerning the impact on individual rights protection. This flagship Brexit 
legislation designed to deliver the legal separation of the UK from the EU, but also guarantee a degree of legal 
certainty through the Brexit Process. In effect, however, it compromises both to achieve neither. The design 
of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 has served to mark the entrenchment of a new vision of the 
division of powers. Critically, without a codified constitution or robust rights protections, the cumulative effect 
of the EUWA creates unprecedented risk to the future of rights protection. 
 
C. Categorisation of Risk posed to Rights by Brexit Process 
The UK’s framework of rights protection is a multi-layered and multi-faceted tapestry of interwoven sources 
and principles, ranging from the common law, to the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] as 
incorporated by the HRA, to rights derived from the EU Treaties and Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
degree of protection and range of remedies available to these rights varies according to their source. This article 
delineates the impact of the Brexit on human rights into four categories,28 categorised by the degree of risk 
posed by the process of separation and legal reform: 
(1) Rights Lost  
This category includes those rights which are predicated on UK membership of the EU, and which 
cannot be replicated or restored in the UK; 
(2) Rights Critically at Risk  
This category includes rights which are capable of replication or restoration in the UK, but which are 
either predicated on agreement with the EU, or are otherwise critically at risk by legislative or 
executive action; 
                                                                
24 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘White Paper on Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union’ (24 July 2018) para 71-71. 
25 See UK Parliament Glossary ‘Henry VIII Clauses’: https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/henry-viii-
clauses/. 
26 Conservative estimates are that between 800 and 1,000 changes will be needed: Department for Exiting the European 
Union, The Repeal Bill: White Paper (30 March 2017) para 3.19. See R Fox, ‘Can the government get all its Brexit 
Statutory Instruments through Parliament by exit day on 29 March?’ (Hansard Society Blog, 12 February 2019) 
https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/can-the-government-get-all-its-brexit-statutory-instruments-through. 
27 See Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, ‘Briefing Paper: Parliament and the Rule of Law in the Context of Brexit’ 
(29 September 2016); House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated 
powers’ 9th Report of Session 2016-17 (7 March 2017) HL Paper 123; House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee published its European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: 3rd Report of Session 2017–19 (TSO, 2017), HL 
Paper 22, 28 September 2017; and M Elliott and S Tierney, ‘The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and Delegated Powers’, UK Const 
L Blog (7th Mar 2017). 
28 For an introductory outline of this taxonomy, see J Grogan, ‘The Only Certainty is Uncertainty: Risk to Rights in the 
Brexit Process’ in E Fahey and T Ahmed (eds), Justice, Injustice and Brexit (Edward Elgar Press) [Forthcoming].  
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(3) Rights Vulnerable to Repeal  
This category of rights may owe their origin to the EU but can or do exist independent of its legal 
framework, but which nevertheless are vulnerable to reform or removal without underlying obligations 
to be protected under EU law;   
(4) Rights at Low Risk of Removal  
This final category of rights does not owe their origin or continued recognition to EU law but are 
recognised at common law or are otherwise at low risk. 
This categorisation rejects arguments based on ‘cross-matching’ whereby a right sourced in one instrument is 
the same or equivalent to another.29 The approach of this article is instead holistic: viewing substantive rights 
protection as a matrix of interrelated inter alia rules, obligations, remedies which are supported by a wider 
multi-level institutional framework. By establishing the risk created by the process of exit, it identifies the 
structural and procedural weaknesses created in the system – rather than the lack of recognition of a right per 
se.  
 
2. RIGHTS LOST 
A. Rights of EU Citizenship Lost 
An inevitable consequence of EU withdrawal is the loss of EU citizenship by British nationals with no other 
claim on EU-27 citizenship.30 UK nationals will also lose a host of rights which cannot be replicated including 
rights to participate in the democracy of the EU, with the right to vote and stand in European Parliament 
elections (Article 39 EUCFR); and the right to vote and stand in municipal elections in Member States where 
the EU citizen is a resident (Article 40 EUCFR). Justiciable rights to good governance, including the right to 
good administration by Union institutions (Article 41 EUCFR); the right of access to documents (Article 42 
EUCFR) and to the European Ombudsman (Article 43 EUCFR); as well as the right to petition the European 
Parliament (Article 44 EUCFR, Article 227 TFEU).  
Crucially, UK citizens will lose free movement rights which them and their families to move and reside freely 
within the EU subject to conditions laid down in the Treaties.31 In outlining its intentions for the future 
relationship with the EU, the Government stated that any future mobility arrangements ‘will be consistent with 
the ending of free movement, respecting the UK’s control of its borders and the Government’s objective to 
control and reduce net migration.’32 EU citizens without any other claim will lose their rights to enter, work 
and reside in the UK following withdrawal.   
 
B. Removal of Oversight and Complaint Mechanisms 
Under the current framework, individuals can make a formal complaint against a member state for violation 
of EU obligations to the Commission. Where this is upheld, the Commission can request that the member state 
                                                                
29 Notably, this methodology was adopted by the Department for Exiting the European Union (n 6), its deficiencies are 
examined in 3(B). 
30 I distinguish here between the total loss of EU citizenship by UK nationals by virtue of UK withdrawal, and the potential 
loss of acquired rights by EU-27 and UK citizens who have exercised Treaty rights to reside in the UK and EU-27 
respectively, and who are the subjects of the Withdrawal Agreement. This is discussed infra 3(A). 
31 Article 45 TFEU. 
32 HM Government ‘The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union’ CM 9593 (July 
2018). 
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respects its obligations or bring the complaint to the Court of Justice for violation of EU law. Oversight by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU] has played an important role in the development of rights 
jurisprudence in the UK. For example, where UK courts have referred questions to the CJEU for preliminary 
references under Article 267 TFEU, this has resulted in the removal of compensation caps for discrimination 
claims;33 included transgender people under the scope of discrimination law;34 and introduced the concept of 
discrimination by association.35 European Commission intervention led to the reform of the law on equal pay 
to remove gender discrimination.36 The idea of external oversight of EU Institutions, particularly the CJEU, 
was argued in the Brexit referendum campaign to be anathema to national sovereignty, and it was an objective 
of Brexit supporters to end the CJEU’s jurisdiction within the UK.37 If the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified, 
the CJEU will have limited oversight in certain matters (eg citizens’ rights),38 but such oversight will be lost 
in any other areas concerning rights, obliging claimants to rely on the common law and ECHR rights.  
Rights which depend on cooperation between the legal systems of the remaining Member States and the UK 
will also be lost with the rejection of CJEU judicial oversight, including those which arise from mutual 
recognition of civil judgments.39 For example, Brussels II Revised Regulation concerns the right of residence 
of a child which could not be then enforced outside of the UK without reciprocal arrangements with the EU-
27. Related to this is the loss of the institutional framework which underpins and supports the ordinary work 
of rights protection within the EU and domestic legal systems: this includes the work of the Fundamental 
Rights Agency,40 and the European Ombudsman,41 which have provided both information and guidance, but 
also reporting and ‘soft pressure’ measures supporting on the protection of rights at national and European 
levels.42 
  
C. Loss of Effective Remedies for Rights Infringement 
Membership of the EU and the EU Charter has played a significant role in the protection and development of 
rights jurisprudence in the UK.43 Nowhere is this clearer than in the effectiveness of remedy for rights 
                                                                
33 C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire AHA (No 2) [1993] IRLR 445. 
34 C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ICR 795. 
35 C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 
36 Case C-61/81 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom [1982] ICR 578. 
37 See eg Vote Leave, ‘Briefing: Taking back control from Brussels’, at 
www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html; Michael Howard and Richard Aikens, ‘The EU’s Court is picking 
apart our laws’ (The Telegraph 22 June 2016); and Liz Bates, ‘Top Tories urge Theresa May to end supremacy of 
European Court of Justice’ (Politics Home 3 December 2017). 
38 See Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (19 March 2018) TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to EU27: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-
ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community-0_en. 
39 See M Kilinsky, ‘Mutual Trust and Cross-border Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters in the EU’ (2017) 64 
Netherlands Intl LR 115; and U Grusic, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Employment Matters in EU 
Private International Law’ (2016) 12 J Private Intl L 521. 
40 The Fundamental Rights Agency is an EU agency which provides fundamental rights expertise to institutions of the 
EU and Member States: see www.fra.europa.eu.  
41 The European Ombudsman is an independent body tasked with holding EU institutions to account, in addition to 
promoting the principle of good administration. 
42 For reports on the work of the Fundamental Rights Agency in the UK, see: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/country-eu/united-
kingdom>. 
43 See eg R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 (HL) 658–59; Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324; Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; 
[2015] 1 WLR 1591, [80].  
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infringement. The EU legal system has long recognised the principle of effectiveness,44 or the requirement that 
domestic rules must not be ‘liable to render practically impossible or excessively difficult’ the exercise of 
rights which have been conferred by EU law.45  A right which provides a weak or little remedy provides little 
incentive to respect rights from a legislative or administrative standpoint, which weakens protection for 
individuals.46 If a provision of national law (of any value) which fall within the scope of EU law47 infringes a 
fundamental right under the EU Charter or a general principle of EU law, the measure must be disapplied by 
national courts under the principle of the supremacy of EU law.48 The supremacy of EU law was a core aspect 
of the anti-EU campaign which argued that the principle violated national sovereignty and British democracy.49 
However, government concern with regard to (EU-)rights has primarily related to the perception that they 
provide ‘protection for people who have no right to be protected’50 to bring challenges against government or 
strike down domestic legislation. 
Antipathy towards any limitation of executive action based on rights grounds is reflected in the systematic 
removal of accountability mechanisms which could be replicated by the EUWA. The right in Francovich for 
damage done by a State acting within scope of EU law and in breach of Treaty rights is removed by the 
EUWA.51 Its removal weakens both an avenue for remedy and also a powerful preventive mechanism (though, 
it must be acknowledged, that the high bar for establishing a ‘sufficiently serious’ breach  has rendered state 
liability pursued through private action as more in principle than in practice).52 Similarly, while general 
principles which have been recognised by the CJEU prior to exit will be incorporated by the EUWA,53 their 
relevance will be limited to interpretation of retained law.54 There will be no right of action based on a failure 
to comply with general principle, and domestic courts will not be permitted to quash any conduct or disapply 
any provision on the basis that it is incompatible with a general principle.55  
Article 47 EUCFR provides the right to an effective remedy and has strengthened access to justice rights. It is 
not limited to the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations, or criminal charges as Article 6 
ECHR is.56 This is in stark contrast to the HRA 1998 which does not incorporate Article 13 ECHR requiring 
an effective remedy before a national authority. The remedies under the ECHR are not equivalent to those 
under EU Law. Under the HRA, it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a manner contrary to the 
                                                                
44 See F Synder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community law’ [1993] MLR 56; and M Accetto and S Zlepting, ‘The 
Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking its role in Community Law’ [2005] Euro Pub L 375. 
45 Case C-268/06 Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food [2008] ECR I-2483, para 46. 
46 W Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale University Press 1946). 
47 Article 51 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also Groussot, Xavier and Pech, Laurent and Petursson, Gunnar 
Thor, ‘The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on Member States' Action: In Search of Certainty in EU 
Adjudication’ (July 1, 2011): https://ssrn.com/abstract=1936473. 
48 In Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and Libya v Janah [2017] UKSC 62, the Court of Appeal held that the embassies of Sudan and 
Libya could not rely on the State Immunity Act 1978 to bar employment rights claims under the EU Working Time 
Directive, as it would violate Article 47 CFR which in turn required the disapplication of the Act. The Court also found 
a violation under Article 6 ECHR and issued a declaration of incompatibility. See A Young, ‘Benkharbouche and the 
Future of Disapplication’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog 24 October 2017). 
49 For academic arguments concerning the question of parliamentary sovereignty and EU membership, see Mark Elliott 
‘Constitutional Legislation, European Union Law and the Nature of the United Kingdom's Contemporary Constitution’ 
[2014] Eur Const LR 379; and Alison Young (ed), ‘Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and International Law 
Perspectives’ (OUP 2013). 
50 Sir Bill Cash MP as reported by Gordon Rayner ‘Britain takes back the right to deport as Britain repeals powers from 
the EU’ (The Telegraph 30 March 2017). 
51 Schedule 1, Part 4 EUWA. 
52 See Tobias Lock, ‘Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth? An Assessment 20 Years after 
Francovich’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 1675. 
53 Schedule 1, Part 2 EUWA. 
54 Tobias Lock, ‘Human rights law in the UK after Brexit’ [2017] PL 117. 
55 Schedule 1, Part 3. 
56 For example, immigration proceedings: ZZ (France) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 
7, [2014] QB 820. See Nik de Boer, ‘Secret evidence and due process rights under EU law’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1235, 
1256–1261. 
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Convention, and any such unlawful action can be quashed.57 The HRA also contains an interpretative 
requirement, in that domestic courts are directed to give effect to legislation in a manner compatible ‘in so far 
as is possible’ to Convention rights.58 While the Courts may issue a declaration of incompatibility where it not 
possible to interpret primary legislation in a manner which does not violate a right under the HRA. Similarly, 
while access to justice has been a principle of the common law, it has not provided equivalent protection, and 
has only served in case law as a principle of interpretation preventing the ‘disproportionate erosions of access 
to justice’.59 
Refuting the arguments that rights will be weakened, DExEU in the Right by Right Analysis argued that 
remedies for rights will not be impacted by the Brexit process, demonstrated by the remedy available under 
the HRA. Curiously, the example given, Benkharbouche, epitomises the weaker effect of the HRA when 
compared with the stronger remedy available under the EU Charter. 60    The UK Supreme Court recognised 
that both the right to access a court (Article 6 ECHR) and the right to a fair trial and effective remedy (Art. 47 
CFR) had been violated.61 As there was a conflict between domestic law and EU law (Article 47 EUCFR) the 
domestic law was disapplied, whereas the remedy for an unavoidable violation of the ECHR, resulted in a only 
in a declaration of incompatibility to Parliament. The irony of citing Benkharbouche is that the decision in this 
case could not have been made following Brexit.62 Cumulatively, the obligations and remedies available under 
the HRA 1998 are not equivalent to directly effective rights, and critically the effective remedies which arise 
from the EU law which will be lost during the Brexit process.  
 
3. RIGHTS CRITICALLY AT RISK 
A. EU Citizens who have exercised their Treaty Rights to become resident in the UK 
EU citizens in the UK face critical uncertainty as to their future during and after the Brexit process, as the 
protection of their rights became a ‘matter for negotiation’ from both the perspective of internal dynamics of 
legislating for (or against) rights protection, or as part of the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship 
with the EU.63 The Joint Committee on Human Rights condemned the use of individuals’ fundamental rights 
as ‘bargaining chips’.64 Their report argued that there would still be recourse to protection under Article 8 
ECHR, but warned against the practical difficulties of overwhelming the courts in the deluge of individual 
cases, as well as the practical impossibility of mass deportation.65  
Since the 2016 report, there has been little certainty and less clarity. The assumption that EU citizens’ rights 
(and UK citizens resident in the EU-27) would be recognised by the Withdrawal Agreement and the 
Withdrawal Agreement (Implementation) Bill have been cast into doubt with the lack of certainty regarding 
                                                                
57 Section 6, HRA 1998. 
58 Section 3, HRA 1998. 
59 Sandra Fredman, Alison Young, and Meghan Campbell, ‘The Continuing Impact of Brexit on Equality Rights’ (Oxford 
Human Rights Hub and The UK in a Changing Europe, 2018) available at: https://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/the-
continuing-impact-of-brexit-on-equality-the-findings/. 
60 DExEU, Right by Right Analysis (n 6) 12-13.  
61 Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs; Libya v Janah [2017] UKSC 62, [78] 
62 Alison Young, ‘Benkharbouche and the Future of Disapplication’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (24th Oct. 2017): 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/. 
63 See House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, The Government’s Negotiating Objectives: the Rights of UK and 
EU citizens; and cf P Daly, K Hughes and K Armstrong, ‘Brexit and EU Nationals: Options for Implementation in UK 
Law’ CEPS/CPL Working Paper Nov 2017 1-14. 
64 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Human Rights Implications of Brexit’ Fifth Session Report of 2016-2017 HL 
Paper 88, HC 695 (19 December 2016). See Ruzi Ziegler, ‘Logically Flawed, morally indefensible: EU Citizens in the 
UK are bargaining chips’ (LSE Brexit Blog 16 February 2017. 
33-34. 
65 ibid 13-18. 
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its future. Attempts to otherwise legislate for the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK prior to withdrawal 
have been unsuccessful: a House of Lords amendment on EU citizens’ rights to the Bill to Trigger Article 50 
was rejected by the House of Commons, and while under the EUWA, it initially appeared that EU citizens’ 
rights which existed before exit would be incorporated into the law, this has been cast into doubt by the 
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination bill as introduced which aims to end free movement, without 
any provision for resident EU citizens and their families.  
Currently, recognition of EU citizens’ rights is in secondary legislation: the UK government amended the 
Immigration Rules to implement a registration scheme giving ‘settled status’ to EU citizens who have been 
resident for five years, and ‘pre-settled’ status to those who have not. This status is constitutive, meaning that 
EU citizens must apply for it and failure to do so within the proscribed time limit will result in the loss of a 
claim to it.66 There is currently no provision for appeal in the event of a rejected application.67 The rights of 
carers, family members, and vulnerable groups (including children and adults in care, and the elderly) have 
not been sufficiently clarified,68 and latent threats of exposure to the ‘hostile environment’ remain.69 Protection 
given by the Withdrawal Agreement (if it is ratified) is limited due to the difficulty of enforcing international 
agreements as an individual. But without even quasi-entrenchment of these rights through ratification of the 
Withdrawal Agreement (which is otherwise constitutionally challenging under the domestic law),70 the rights 
and future of EU citizens in the UK remains at risk as they are vulnerable to changes in immigration policy by 
government.71 
 
B. Contradiction in the ‘Equivalence of Rights’ 
The EU Charter codifies fundamental rights, including first-generation rights of life72 liberty,73 and the 
prohibition on torture74 and the death penalty,75 as well as socio-economic rights, and third-generation rights 
such as the protection of personal data.76 The primary justification offered for the removal of the Charter is 
that it is not a source of rights, but rather it only ‘reaffirmed the existing legally binding fundamental rights, in 
a new and binding document’.77 This is a non-sequitur. If it were true that the Charter serves only to codify 
rights which are already binding on actions which fall within its scope, then this would be a reason to 
incorporate the Charter.78 The UK would benefit from such codification as an easy, and accessible source of 
rights, listed and clarified, for the interpretation and application of retained law. There could be no arguments 
                                                                
66 Home Office, EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of Intent, 21 June 2018. For the website, see 
<https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families>. See Stijn Smismans, ‘EU Citizens’ Rights post Brexit: why 
direct effect beyond the EU is not enough’ [2018] Eur Const LR 443. 
67 The Statement of Intent clarifies only that an Independent Authority and the right of appeal must be set out in primary 
legislation (ibid 1.9). See Smismans (n75) 450. The critical risk is rendered acute by the exemption for immigration 
proceedings under the Data Protection Act 2018, see infra Section 4(B). 
68 Smismans (n75). 
69 Ibid. See also Thomas Colson, ‘EU citizens could be the next victims of Theresa May’s ‘Hostile’ Immigration policy’ 
Business Insider 24 April 2018, available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/eu-citizens-theresa-may-hostile-environment-
immigration-brexit-2018-4?r=US&IR=T. 
70 Daly et al, ‘Brexit and EU Nationals: Options for Implementation in UK Law’ (n 63). 
71 Steve Peers, ‘What’s next for acquired rights of EU27 and UK citizens?’ EU Legal Analysis Blog 6 February 2018; 
available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/02/whats-next-for-acquired-rights-of-eu27.html 
72 Article 2 EUCFR. 
73 Article 6 EUCFR. 
74 Article 4 EUCFR. 
75 Article 2 EUCFR.  
76 Article 8 EUCFR. 
77 DExEU, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Right by Right Analysis’ (5/12/2017)  
78 J Grogan, ‘The good, the bad and the ugly arguments for ditching the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (LSE Brexit 
Blog, 1 February 2018): https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/02/01/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-arguments-for-
ditching-the-eu-charter-of-fundamental-rights/. 
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as to whether a right did or did not exist (as will likely arise in future litigation). However, the inverse is argued: 
the Charter is not relevant as it merely restates rights sourced elsewhere. It has been asserted that the excision 
of the EU Charter will not undermine ‘substantive rights’ which otherwise have existed and exist elsewhere in 
EU law, and thus will be converted into UK law.79 The EUWA references these as ‘underlying rights’ which 
will be relevant to the interpretation by the UK Courts, even when interpreting references to the Charter in 
converted case law. A point weakened by the lack of conclusive identification of ‘directly effective’ Treaty 
provisions, or guidance by the EUWA as to the identification of these rights.  
The confusion of what constitutes an ‘underlying right’ when the codified account has been removed creates 
significant legal certainty and undermines codified rights which do not exist at common law or in other rights 
instruments.80 Where the contention that the Brexit process will not undermine substantive rights protection 
was repeatedly challenged, notably by the House of Lords EU Committee,81 DExEU, arguing that an 
equivalence of rights is found elsewhere,82 asserted that rights contained within the Charter will continue to be 
afforded protection through converted EU law; the ECHR83 or International Rights Instruments; and the 
common law84 or domestic legislation. Each of these statements are either untrue or misleading.  
DExEU’s analysis stated that 18 Charter rights ‘correspond, entirely or largely, to articles’ of the ECHR and 
are ‘as a result, protected both internationally and, through the Human Rights Act 1998 and devolution 
statutes’. Such an assertion obfuscates the multiplicity of sources of rights reflected in the Charter, and the 
irony that the rationale for codification in the Charter was exactly to provide a single, clear source of rights to 
avoid reference to a plethora of sources. Similarly, a right being ‘largely’ the same as listed in another 
instrument is misleading, omitting the weaker remedies and challenge of establishing standing85 under other 
instruments,86 as evidenced by recent case law showing the relative importance of the EU Charter in BAT 
Industries,87 AZ,88 and in the seminal Benkharbouche.89  
Curiously, DEXEU also forwarded the argument that Charter rights, where not found in common law or 
ECHR, could be covered by international treaties, overlooking the fact that international treaties (other than 
the EU Treaties) may not confer enforceable rights upon individuals where they have not been incorporated 
into domestic law. Some instruments identified as sources of Charter Rights have not been signed or ratified 
by the UK: for example, the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Where there 
has been incorporation (eg the Statute of the International Criminal Court)90 this incorporation does not confer 
enforceable rights on the individual, but rather only criminalises conduct. Other important international rights 
treaties have not been incorporated at all: for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 194891 is 
                                                                
79 ibid. 
80 See Merris Amos ‘Red Herrings and Reductions: Human Rights and the EU (Withdrawal) Bill’ (UK Constitutional 
Law Association) available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/10/04/merris-amos-red-herrings-and-reductions-
human-rights-and-the-eu-withdrawal-bill/. 
81 Select Committee on the Constitution of the House of Lords: ‘The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and Delegated Powers’ 9th Report 
of Session 2016-2017 HL Paper 123. 
82 DExEU, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Right by Right Analysis’ (n 6). 
83 See infra 4(C). 
84 See infra 5.  
85 See eg ‘victimhood’ under Article 34 ECHR; Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey [GC], 1§§ 100 and 122; Loizidou v. 
Turkey (preliminary objections), §70; Vallianatos and Others v Greece [GC], § 47) 
86 See supra 2(C). 
87 [2017] UKFTT 558 (TC), wherein the First Tier Tribunal held that the claimants’ right to effectiveness under Article 
47 EUCFR, in addition general principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation, whereas Article 6 ECHR right to 
fair hearing was not as it did not apply to tax disputes. 
88 [2017] EWCA Civ 35, wherein the Court of Appeal held that Article 47 EUCFR applied to immigration decisions, 
whereas Article 6 ECHR did not. 
89 [2017] UKSC 62. See supra Section 2C for discussion. 
90 International Criminal Court Act 2001. 
91 Acknowledged as the source for the Right to Human Dignity (Article 1 EUCFR). See also C. Dupré, ‘Human Dignity 
is Inviolable. It Must be Respected and Protected: Retaining the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights After Brexit’ (2018) 
EHRLR 101. 
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not legally binding and cannot be relied upon in proceedings; and the Refugee Convention has not been 
incorporated.92 It is disingenuous to argue that rights sourced in international treaties guarantee the same level 
of protection as currently guaranteed by the EU Charter. The only certainty in this, is that where the EU Charter 
is lost, rights recognised within it which are not either easily identifiable or recognised elsewhere in EU or UK 
case law, or the ECHR are critically at risk. 
 
C. The Good Argument for the Removal of the EU Charter (and why it’s wrong) 
The EU Charter has become the primary source of fundamental rights in the EU.93 The good argument for the 
removal of the Charter in the EUWA is that the Charter is designed to operate only within the scope of EU 
law, therefore it will have no relevance after withdrawal from the EU, as the UK will no longer operate within 
that scope of authority. The best form of this argument is that the EU Charter can only make sense in the 
context of EU membership, as ‘the Charter, the principles it contains, and the evolution of its meaning and 
interpretation are all tied to membership of the EU.’94 This knotted relationship encompasses both the driving 
political philosophy of embracing rights as a fundamental value of the EU, but also the legal practicalities of 
CJEU judgments, and the collective constitutional narrative which serves as a source of recognition and scope 
of these rights.95  
Once the Charter (or reference to the Charter) is ‘unmoored’ from EU membership and the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU, it would be ‘impossible to predict its likely direction of travel within domestic law.’96 Where the 
Charter does not have an anchor in the membership, institutions and acquis of the EU, it loses its relevance. 
There are two responses: (1) the Charter will continue to have relevance to retained EU law, particularly where 
retained EU law, or pre-Brexit UK and CJEU case law, contains explicit reference to Charter rights. Such 
continuing relevance of the Charter to the interpretation of retained law is recognised by the EUWA which 
states that the removal of the Charter ‘does not affect the retention in domestic law on or after exit day in 
accordance with this Act of any fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the Charter (and 
references to the Charter in any case law are, so far as necessary for this purpose, to be read as if they were 
references to any corresponding retained fundamental rights or principles)’.97 The complication this clause 
aims to resolve leads to the second response to the argument: explicitly excluding the Charter in the 
interpretation of retained law, and in litigation concerning former Charter rights, will cause significant 
confusion and uncertainty in practice as Courts and litigants must rely on the ambiguous authority of 
‘underlying’ rights to be found in a multiplicity of sources. This confusion will be compounded by distinctions 
arising from interpretive obligations owed to retained law, and new law introduced to replace it either through 
primary legislation (eg the envisioned Agriculture, and Customs Bills)98 or through delegated powers under 
the EUWA, the latter of which will not be subject to interpretation based on ‘underlying rights’.99   
 
                                                                
92 Article 18 EUCFR provides for the right to asylum. The UK opted out of the right to asylum under Article 78 TFEU, 
and due to Article 21 of Protocol 21 of the Treaties, Article 78 TFEU is not binding on the UK. 
93 Article 6 TEU states three formal sources for human rights in the EU: the EU Charter, general principles of EU law, 
and the European Convention of Human Rights as a ‘source of special significance’. Since 2009, the Court of Justice of 
the EU has placed primary importance on the EU Charter as the principal basis for the assessment of human rights 
compliance. 
94 Mark Elliott, Stephen Tierney and Alison Young, ‘Human Rights Post-Brexit: The Need for Legislation?’ Public Law 
for Everyone 8 February 2018, available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2018/02/08/human-rights-post-brexit-the-
need-for-legislation/. 
95 S Morano-Foadi and L Vickers (eds) Fundamental Rights in the EU (Hart 2015). 
96 Elliott et al (n 94). 
97 Section 5(5) EUWA. 
98 See the Queens Speech to Parliament 2017 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2017. 
99 See Amos (n 80). 
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4. RIGHTS VULNERABLE TO REPEAL 
A. Weakening the Foundation of Equality, Worker and Consumer Rights 
In the absence of codified constitution, provisions of primary EU law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and directly effective rights within the EU Treaties, have held quasi-constitutional status capable of disapplying 
national norms of any status including Acts of Parliament. Even in the absence of implementing legislation, 
directly effective rights including non-discrimination on grounds of nationality,100 equal treatment,101 and equal 
pay102 can be enforced in domestic courts.103 As consumers and workers are at the core of the functioning of 
the Single Market, associated regulation inevitably came within the scope of EU law.104 While there is still a 
question of the UK’s future relationship with the Single Market, consumer and workers’ rights do not 
necessarily depend on it to exist. As identified by the High Court in Miller, rights including employment 
protection (in the Working Time Directive), equal treatment and the protection of EU competition law as well 
as the rights of non-residents to enjoy the benefit of four freedoms within the UK could be replicated without 
EU membership.   
While the Equality Act 2010 is not dependent on the ECA (and in many cases the legislation has gone beyond 
the requirements of EU law), equality law is indebted to the EU.105 Women’s groups have commented on the 
benefit brought by EU membership to the position of women’s rights, particularly with regard to sex 
discrimination, maternity,106 parenthood,107 and the right to equal pay for equal work: for example, the 
Commission’s infringement action against the UK on the matter of legislating for unequal pay.108 Equally, in 
Walker109 the Supreme Court held that the Equality Act 2010 is incompatible with EU law and must be 
disapplied, and that Mr Walker’s husband is entitled on his death to a spouse’s pension, provided they remain 
married.  
This body of rights will not be lost or removed with Brexit. The transformation wrought by Brexit will be at 
once subtle, and more deceptively benign. The vulnerability of rights within this category lies in the fact that 
their continued existence is subject to the political will to protect them, as there may be no further EU obligation 
to recognise them. While the HRA is immune from amendment by Henry VIII powers under the EUWA, no 
such immunity is given to the Equality Act 2010.110 Ministers could, through secondary legislation, modify or 
remove exceptions given under the Equality Act 2010111 and justifications for discrimination112 could be 
                                                                
100 Article 18 TFEU. 
101 Article 19 TFEU, which prohibits discrimination to sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation beyond employment to good, services, housing, education and social protection: all currently 
implemented through the Equality Act 2010. See Nicole Busby, ‘Equality law, Brexit and devolution’ [2017] Emp L B 
4.  
102 Article 157 TFEU. 
103 For analysis, see Colm O’Cinneide, The Evolution and Impact of the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC (Brussels, Belgium: Migration Policy Group, 2012). 
104 See Iris Benohr, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights (2013 OUP) ch 2; and A Bogg, C Costello, ACL Davies, J 
Prassl, The Autonomy of Labour Law (2015 Hart Publishing) ch 9. 
105 Busby (n 101). 
106 See eg Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC). 
107 Parental Leave Directive (2010/18/EU). 
108 See Case C-61/81 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom [1982] ICR 578.  
109 Walker v Innospec and others [2017] UKSC 47. 
110 Fredman et al (n 59). Amendments to prevent change to the Equality Act 2010 and consumer rights were proposed at 
committee stage but failed to pass: see <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-
2019/0005/amend/euwithdrawal_rm_cwh_1011.50-56.html> 
111 Sections 191-197 Equality Act 2010. 
112 Sections 13(2), 15, 19(2)(d). 
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extended. 113 Even where there is no express intention to reduce or weaken equality law, without the external 
obligation of EU law, equality law is made ‘vulnerable to change and neglect.’114  
Consumer and workers’ rights are in a similar position as equality law, having been driven by the exigencies 
of the Internal Market, and extended by the EU beyond the bare minimum of safety standards. A host of 
directives implemented in the UK have extended the protection of workers, 115 to those working on part-time, 
temporary and fixed term contracts.116 Like the Equality Act 2010, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 can trace 
its origin to EU legal obligations. Theresa May has spoken of the continued guarantee of workers’ rights,117 
and agreed political intentions on future relationship with the EU include mutual obligations to ‘commit to the 
non-regression of labour standards’ and also to ‘maintain reciprocal high levels of consumer protection’. 118 
However, concerns remain that in the absence of external obligations, consumer and labour rights would 
continue post-Brexit until it became politically expedient for them not to, for example, as a condition of any 
future trade deal.119  
International agreements do not enjoy the same level of parliamentary scrutiny over negotiation and ratification 
than there is or EU legislation.120 Scrutiny over external agreements is also tied with comparative negotiating 
power. In its external action, the EU has emphasised the promotion of its core values – human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law,121  in addition to the promotion of trade and development with the EU. Concerns 
have been voiced that in the (re)negotiation of trade deals with over 65 countries, the UK government may aim 
to balance a weaker negotiating position (a smaller market, and time and resource pressure) with a reduction 
in labour standards (including maternity, parental leave, equal pay, working-time and agency worker rights) 
in order to improve competitiveness in the international market.122 Without sufficient domestic protection, for 
example in the requirement of a clause protecting labour rights in trade agreements, these rights are at increased 
vulnerability through the Brexit process. 
 
B. Vulnerability of ‘New’ Rights 
                                                                
113 Busby (n 101). 
114 ibid. 
115 EU Directive 2000/78/EC (the Framework Directive) requires member states to prohibit discrimination, including on 
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Reviling the EU Charter as containing ‘flabby Euro-rights‘, Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the EU Suella 
Fernandes argued for the ‘tried and tested’ ECHR which enshrines ‘basic, fundamental’ rights.123  The EU 
Charter is a source of rights, and (importantly) a source of additional rights which are not recognised in the 
ECHR or in the common law. There is nothing particularly Euro-centric about these rights, and EU citizenship 
is not one of the conditions of their applicability. It is unsurprising that rights have developed as times have 
changed: before the internet, and the capacity for mass collection of personal and sensitive data, there was no 
need to recognise a right to data protection.124 The prohibition on human cloning was not necessary before it 
was possible to do so.125 These so-called third-generation rights are vulnerable where there is a regressive 
attitude towards them, or where they are considered second- (or third-)order to other concerns, notably, 
national security and immigration policy. 
Such differences in UK and EU attitudes are demonstrated by data protection rights. The CJEU has developed 
rights to privacy and data protection beyond standards set by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as in Digital 
Rights Ireland.126 The recognition of the right to be forgotten in Google Spain127 based on the extension of 
Articles 7 and 8 EU Charter, and it is unique to EU law, not being found in another rights instrument. In terms 
of the future vulnerability of these rights, the UK has already shown reticence towards the right to data 
protection as regards data retention. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (nicknamed the Snoopers’ Charter) have shown a ‘legal and political blind 
eye’128 to the wide powers of data retention and interception without requisite safeguarding of individual rights. 
The Data Protection Act 2018 [DPA], ostensibly implementing the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, 
removes the rights of person subject to immigration procedures to have access to the data held about them.129 
By doing so, the DPA makes individuals unable to correct or delete any incorrect or unlawfully obtained 
information about them,  creating Kafkaesque situation whereby individuals could be condemned in both 
innocence and ignorance which could disproportionately affect the fundamental rights of non-UK citizens.130   
It is likely that the future of data protection will be determined by future agreement with the EU,131 which has 
shown a strict standard for compliance both within,132 and outside133  of its borders with regard to the processing 
of data of EU citizens. Compliance with a standard of ‘essential equivalence’ with EU data protection could 
be a condition for participation in the single market, and lowering standards of data protection would jeopardise 
access to cross-border transfers.134 However, this protection may not extend to other ‘new’ rights which are 
not necessary for a transactions with the Single Market, and protections for UK citizens or non-EU citizens 
interacting with state bodies may not fall within the scope of protection. 
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C. The European Convention on Human Rights 
The ECHR is not an EU instrument and should ostensibly be unaffected by the Brexit process. Nevertheless, 
the HRA, which incorporates the ECHR into domestic law, was explicitly excluded from amendment, repeal 
or revocation by powers delegated under the EUWA.135 The future of the ECHR is not, however, guaranteed 
and has been made vulnerable by the Brexit process. Once the UK withdraws from the EU, there will be no 
implicit requirement to be part of the ECHR. While there is no express requirement as part of Article 49 TEU 
which governs EU accession, in practice the European Commission has regularly assessed compliance with 
the ECHR as part of commitment to Article 2 TEU values,136 implying a clear expectation that Member States 
are part of the Council of Europe and compliant with ECHR standards.137  
The Conservative government’s stated intention is to withdraw from the ECHR and repeal the HRA.138 The 
Prime Minister, who has long held a stance against the ECHR,139 stated in 2016 that the UK should leave the 
ECHR regardless of the EU referendum result.140 In the face of widespread criticism, particularly from the 
perspective of the Northern Ireland peace process in which the ECHR plays a key role,141 the Prime Minister 
has since oscillated between rejection142 and commitment143 to the ECHR.144 This has been an concern for the 
EU, particularly where it impacts on security cooperation.145 The draft Outline on the Future Relationship 
between the UK and EU includes a ‘reaffirmation’ of the UK’s commitment to the ECHR (and the EU and 
Members States to the EU Charter) as a basis for cooperation.146 However, in the shadow of the long-held 
antipathy, the HRA and continued role for the ECHR are vulnerable. Political commitments are not legally 
binding, and the HRA could be repealed – even where the UK remains part of the ECHR. 
 
 
5. RIGHTS AT LOW RISK OF REMOVAL 
The least vulnerable category of rights during the Brexit process are those rights which can claim a long legacy, 
firmly rooted in the British constitution and that are recognised at, and rooted in, the common law. These rights 
include personal security, personal liberty and private property, and can trace their origin back centuries within 
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the development of common law.147 These rights, where recognised, are least vulnerable by the Brexit process. 
However, they provide less effective remedy and would be weakened by the loss of EU Charter and ECHR 
influence.  
The courts may strike down acts and decisions of administrative bodies, Ministers and devolved legislatures if 
they contravene ‘common law constitutional rights' unless the public body is authorised to do so by an Act of 
Parliament.148 The courts have held that discretionary powers framed broadly cannot be used to infringe rights, 
and any such discretionary powers which may impinge on rights must have clear and precise wording.149 
Increasingly, judges may read down the scope of Henry VIII clauses to protect fundamental rights, which could 
play an important role in limiting the use of delegated powers under the EUWA. However, this is an emerging 
principle and its scope of application has not yet been made out.150 Beyond questions of standing and cost 
(particularly where there is little or no access to legal aid), a higher standard of review is applied in domestic 
courts where the judicial review action involves a common law right.151 Where the source of violation comes 
from an Act of Parliament, the principle of legality can be engaged by the courts to read down legislation,152 
which has served as a powerful tool to avoid the undermining of rights.153 However, while the Supreme Court 
has shown a commitment to subvert the relatively clear intention of Parliament particularly where the content 
concerns what was recognised to be a right of constitutional importance,154 this is still a less effective remedy 
than either offered under the HRA or the EU Charter.  
There is an essential uncertainty in common law constitutional rights, as ‘the jurisprudential approach lacks 
coherence’.155 This leads to the question of which rights and whether ECHR rights are replicated in the common 
law, and further whether the established ECHR case law will be reincorporated or re-interpreted into the 
system. A significant interpretive debt is owed to the introduction of European human rights law to the 
domestic legal system.156 In R (Osborn) v Parole Board, Lord Reed stated that the common law of human 
rights falls to be developed ‘in accordance with’ the HRA when appropriate.157 Equally, while it could be 
argued that CJEU jurisprudence could indirectly aid future cases through persuasive precedent in the 
interpretation of UK law, what is lost is the future and the potential of the EU Charter, where the ‘sheer breadth 
of rights (and principles) offered in the Charter and their often broader formulation compared with 
corresponding rights contained in the ECHR, suggest a large potential for stronger human rights protection 
than currently available.’158  
Where rights are not recognised, replicated (or replicable), we may see a return to alternative fields of law to 
replace ‘Euro-rights’ lost or diminished during the Brexit process. For example, consumer protection is 
regulated by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 among other primary acts which are in turn based on EU 
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directives:159 were these to be repealed, recourse for consumers might then return to principles of tort and 
contract law.160  Indeed, relative to those rights which are vulnerable to repeal, and critically at risk – these are 
rights which have been recognised long before the HRA, and (it could be assumed) be least at risk. 
An optimistic narrative of the post-Brexit legal landscape is one in which protection of individual rights and 
liberties at common law enjoy a renaissance, as judges push for a more robust protection of the individual 
rooted in British constitutional traditions. Indeed, an emerging narrative of common law constitutional rights 
has ‘galvanised public law’.161 In a searing section of the Unison judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed their 
role in ensuring that the executive carries out its functions in accordance with the law, and as regards its view 
on Parliamentary democracy,162 the rule of law,163 and access to justice which can be regarded as a ‘shot across 
the bow’ with reference to future anti-rights policies: 
‘Without such access [to the Courts], laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may 
be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless 
charade.’164  
This cause for optimism is limited, however, by the loss to the common law of the aid of international human 
rights instruments, institutions and courts in the interpretation and development of the law. A focus on the 
courts too as the means by which rights can be protected is a narrow approach, predicated on decisions made 
on a case-by-case basis. While less vulnerable, rights protected at common law will not replace what will be a 
significant loss for human rights protection post-Brexit.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
There should be little doubt that the Brexit process will have a negative impact on the framework of rights 
protection in the UK. Even where rights and remedies are not lost, they are critically at risk or significantly 
and substantially weakened. In the narrative of ‘taking back control’ spurred by the ‘will of the people’, the 
meaning of democracy has become maligned to be the rejection of rights and mechanisms of state 
accountability – epitomised in the Brexit process in excising the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as 
the most effective remedies against rights infringement. Political assertions that individuals will enjoy the same 
if not equal protections following Brexit are unconvincing if not disingenuous: UK citizens will lose rights 
with their EU citizenship; and resident EU citizens’ rights became ‘bargaining chips’. The ECHR remains 
under constant threat; just as worker, consumer, and data rights will become questions of political will, not 
legal obligation. Even in areas where there is no immediate diminution of rights, there is increased vulnerability 
and unjust uncertainty. Through the systematic removal of accountability at the highest levels of governance, 
a vacuum could be created by the Brexit process: a lack of certainty, a loss of protection, and a silence where 
there was once an acceptance and commitment to protection of individual and fundamental rights across the 
UK. 
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